Corporate governance issues often figure prominently in litigation, but the issues raised typically have a narrow focus. Disputes most often build on the formal legal skeleton of corporate governance created by the state’s corporation’s statutes, the particular corporation’s organizational documents, and the judicially imposed fiduciary duty of directors and officers. However, this structure represents an overly formal and significantly incomplete understanding of what makes up a publicly held corporation’s corporate governance structure. In this article, we outline the much broader corporate governance structure that underlies the operation of a modern public corporation, and show how that structure has important implications for a wider range of litigation than is commonly understood.
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Posted by Ronald J. Gilson, Columbia Law School & and Stanford Law School, and Hans Weemaes, Cornerstone Research, on Thursday, February 23, 2017
Editor's Note: Ronald J. Gilson is Marc & Eva Stern Professor of Law and Business at Columbia Law School, Meyers Professor of Law and Business (Emeritus) at Stanford Law School, and a senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. Hans Weemaes is a principal at Cornerstone Research. This post is based on a Cornerstone Research publication by Professor Gilson, Mr. Weemaes, Ilene Friedland, and Cameron Hooper.